"It does this" he responds, "by granting and protecting their rights. That is, any human child born on the territory of... [a] liberal state is by that very act endowed with certain rights .... "2 This underlies the historical evolution of the status of the individual in society, from the mere subject of a sovereign, then a citizen of his or her own state to the modern era where the individual in a liberal democracy is him or herself a source of rights by virtue of the human dignity of the person.
When a court is placed in the position of being not the first, but the final, guarantor of the fundamental rights of the individual, it means that the "absolute supremacy or predominance of regular laws" of which the British Constitutionalist Dicey spoke is no longer true. 3 Such a court looks to the individual as enjoying those fundamental rights autonomously and, more importantly, antecedent to so-called "regular law" whose validity may be called into question for infringing the rights vested in the individual.
The role of the courts in the protection of human rights in any legal system is a constitutionally sensitive one. The observance and protection of such rights articulate with many aspects 
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Inevitably all of this poses particular challenges for a supranational court with jurisdiction to pass judgment on human rights compliance, directly or indirectly, by states that are justly proud of their own legal democratic traditions.
The exercise by the European Court of Justice ("Court of Justice" or "Court") ofjurisdiction to protect the individual from breaches of their fundamental rights is a constitutional role which trammels not only the exercise of political power by the institutions of the European Community (the "Community") but indirectly (and often directly) the use of governmental and legislative power at a national level. This constitutional role, exercised in the context of the doctrines of primacy and direct effect, challenges the ideology of a state's legal autonomy and the associated sense of self-determination. Not surprisingly, the Court of Justice at the early stages showed a marked reluctance to be drawn into this area. 4 The exercise of such a far-reaching constitutional function cannot be lightly undertaken, or more to the point, cannot be undertaken at all, unless there is a credible legitimate basis for doing so. Yet, as we know, the founding treaties contained no reference to human or fundamental rights. 5 If the Community was to survive, let alone develop as a supranational institution exercising sovereign powers over liberal democracies in which fundamental individual rights were consti- tutionally protected, it faced enormous challenges due to this deficit. This is an opportune occasion to reflect on the past as well as to look afresh at the remarkable evolution of Community law, its complexity and-perhaps most importantly-its future. If the development of Community law may be seen as a narrative of sorts, I am pleased to examine today one of its more important chapters, namely, the protection of fundamental rights in the Community legal order.
It is a chapter of the Community narrative which has been penned in the main by judicial hands, and is of course an aspect of the wider process, led by the Court of Justice, of creating from the Treaty of Rome a supranational constitutional charter. The founding milestones of this process are familiar to all of you here and I do not need to dwell on them: the enunciation of the doctrines of direct effect in NVAlgemene Transport-en Expedetie Onderneming van Through these doctrines the Court of Justice made a pivotal contribution to Community law. Through the doctrine of direct effect it effectively revolutionised the functional role of the Treaty of Rome and transformed the individual citizens into agents of integration, a dynamic force capable of promoting evolution of this new legal order by virtue of their right to challenge, in individual cases, the compatibility of national measures with Community law-a route that is perhaps now taken for granted-while the doctrines of primacy and pre-emption ensured the stability and coherence of the Community legal order. 10 This new order, however, had a void at its core. Given that In this manner, the development of Community law has relied not only on the willingness of national courts to refer issues to the Court of Justice but also on their acceptance of the resultant decisions as applying not only to the instant case but as a binding legal precedent with erga omnes effect. The national courts, whether willingly or reluctantly, have thus played perhaps the most dynamic role of all and the relationship between the national courts and the Court of Justice has therefore been described as one of collaboration rather than competition or, as the Court diplomatically puts it, 'dialogue.' That said, attempts to constrain the Court's impact in the field of fundamental rights have been "weak and few," '2 ' and in reality, far from being unhappy with the Court's approach, the Member States have so far actively endorsed it. 29 The Court's leading role in the protection of fundamental rights has seen successive treaties fashioned by the Member States traditionally playing 'catch up,' if you will, with its case law by enshrining respect for such rights in successive treaties, from human rights references in the Single European Act 198630 and the preamble to the Maastricht Treaty" l to the declaration in Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union (Treaty of Amsterdam) 3 2 that:
The Union shall respect fundamental rights as guaranteed by [the European Convention on Human Rights] and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law. 3 This reflects in part the Court's own statement in Nold v. Commission that in safeguarding fundamental rights it "is bound to draw inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States," 3 4 and that "international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories can supply guidelines which should be followed in the framework of Community
As the late Federico Mancini observed in 1989, while the principle of respect for fundamental rights "was forced on the Court from the outside, by the German and, later, the Italian Constitutional Courts, ' 36 the Court's reading of an unwritten bill of rights into Community law is its "most striking contribution" to the development of a constitution for Europe. 7 Achieved within, and parallel to, the overall process of constitutionalization, it has resulted in a situation where, in an ever-increasing field of Community competences, every citizen now has equal rights that can be enforced before the Court, and indeed before national courts, or as Advocate General Jacobs put it in Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteig-Standesamt, 3 8 " [i] n other words, [a Community national] is entitled to say 'civis europeus sum' and to invoke that status in order to oppose any violation of his fundamental rights." 3 9
The content of this unwritten bill of rights is of course, by its very nature, impossible to ascertain definitively. However, a number of points are clear. One is that the Court's references to national constitutions as a source of rights have been sporadic and perfunctory, rather than systematic or scientific. 4 While the Court of Justice has never said that the European Convention is formally binding on the Community or that its provisions are directly incorporated into Community law, 4 2 it recognized the European Convention's pre-eminence as early as 199143 and has repeatedly affirmed that the Convention has "special significance" in fundamental rights cases." Indeed, the Court of Justice's use of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (the "Strasbourg Court") to define the scope of fundamental rights in Community law 4 5 has led to the observation that it has blurred the distinction between the Convention as an 'inspiration' for fundamental rights and as a 'source' of such rights. On the other hand, the Court has consistently stated that the nature and scope of a fundamental right must be determined autonomously in Community law.
4 7 The expansion of the Community's competence in the protection of fundamental rights has not only focused attention on this unwritten bill of rights but, more importantly, raised the spectre of a duality and divergence emerging between the supranational Community legal order and the international system of the European Convention, which some view as undesirable. The argument has been repeatedly made that the only satisfactory resolution to the question of divergence is for the Community to accede to the European Convention, an option which was discussed as early as 197948 and which the Court held, in its Opinion 2/94"9 on accession, would require Treaty amendment. Accession is also said to be the only solution to the prevailing anomaly whereby, despite the fact that the acts of the EU itself may not currently be challenged directly in the Strasbourg Court, a Member State may be held responsible for alleged violations of a Convention right through the enactment of national legislation implementing Community law, 5 " thereby trapping them between the 'rock' of Community law and the 'hard place' of Convention obligations.
A response to both questions has been provided, not by the Court of Justice, but by the Member States, first, through the 'solemn proclamation' of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights While it does not establish any new power for the Community or the EU, it does contain numerous innovations (for example, provisions on biotechnology such as the prohibition on human cloning) 57 and a commitment to open-ended abstract concepts, such as the dignity of the individual. 5 It also contains a more neutrally worded right to marriage 5 9 which excludes the reference in Article 12 of the European Convention to "men and women," 60 a difference highlighted by the Strasbourg Court in the Goodwin v. United Kingdom 6 case, to which I refer below.
The Charter's current legal status is also somewhat ambiguous. While, pending adoption and entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, it is not legally binding, it has already been accorded an influential place in Community law, firstly, through its endorsement by all EU institutions, 6 It would appear reasonable to assume that it is unlikely the Charter will be used in any bold decision until and unless it is rendered legally binding through adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, at which point other issues, such as its relationship to the European Convention, will give rise to more concrete scrutiny, especially where there is a divergence in the text or legal context. In ble to assume that the Charter will produce all its effects, legal and others, whatever its nature .. . 67 striking down a blanket ban on transsexuals marrying as a breach of the right to marry in Article 12 of the ECHR, 68 referred, although in a rather self-serving fashion, to the corresponding Charter guarantee's departure, in its view "no doubt deliberately," 69 from the wording of the ECHR Article in removing the reference to men and women. 7°S uffice it to say, then, that the Charter, even in its present non-binding form, can nonetheless be described as a "legally relevant, and constitutionally significant, document" 7 1 in the Community legal order and may yet, particularly once it becomes legally binding, have far-reaching effects through the case law of both the Court of Justice and importations from the European Court of Human Rights.
The Charter potentially exacerbates rather than resolves the possibility of divergence between the Community legal order and the Convention system and this therefore must remain a preoccupation for the Court of Justice in the field of fundamental rights. This has led the Court to engage increasingly in a dialogue, parallel to its dialogue with national courts, with the Strasbourg Court. It is a dialogue characterized by a spirit of what has been called "good neighbourliness, "72 in recognition of the need for both courts to work together and to avoid a "prestige battle" 3 A major goal [in devising the European human rights protection system of the twenty-first century] should be to reinforce a harmonious and efficient interplay between the two systems, in other words their complementarity. 4 Both Courts have made great efforts to render such complementarity a reality rather than rhetoric. In a few cases, divergence has arisen simply due to the Court of Justice getting the 'first bite of the apple,' as it were, at interpretation of a Convention right and it has shown a willingness to revise such interpretations in line with subsequent rulings in Strasbourg. The Court subsequently reversed this stance some thirteen years later in Roquettes Frres SA v. Commission 7 ' due to an intervening decision by the Strasbourg Court 79 which held that the Article did in fact extend to business premises,"° the Court of Justice explicitly referred to the case law of the Strasbourg Court on the issue since the Court's decision in Hoechst.
Possibly a major source of divergence is the fact that, by definition, each court pursues different objectives. It has been said that:
The ECHR interprets the Convention according to the Convention's objectives, while the ECJ interprets it according to FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:531 the Community's objectives. However, the two sets of objectives do not necessarily coincide. The Convention's aim is to protect the individual as a human being, while the Community's aim is to further economic and social integration."" While these aims are not mutually exclusive it is perhaps inevitable that the different legal order in which the Court of Justice operates necessitates a balancing of interests that may not be familiar to the Strasbourg Court. Firstly, the importance of the doctrine of primacy of Community law over national law means that, in certain instances the Community law standard must apply even if it provides less protection than national or international fundamental rights standards. Secondly, uniformity is integral to the functioning of the Community legal order and, were a national court unwilling to follow a decision of the Court of Justice because it felt it had other obligations under the European Convention-this could give rise to a "veritable constitutional crisis. ' "82 This could readily arise in the context of the Bosphorus doctrine as endorsed by the CFI, to which I refer later.
However, while the Court of Justice is therefore required to engage in a more difficult balancing act between fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Community law and fundamental rights that are of a more universal nature it has at least shown some reluctance to sacrifice fundamental rights on the altar of Community integration where this can be avoided. This necessitates continual efforts to reconcile the two, with the doctrine of proportionality used as the favourite medium for doing so, as seen in cases such as dom of expression-to 'trump' the right to free movement of goods having decided that the interference with that freedom was proportionate. 8 6 The Strasbourg Court has also been required to engage in some nimble footwork to maintain harmony between the two systems. Faced with the erosion of its jurisdiction ratione personae and ratione materiae as a result of increasing transfers of powers from Member States to the EU, 8 7 it has had to attempt to fill the resulting lacuna in human rights protection while displaying considerable reluctance to "pierce the veil" 8 " of the autonomous Community legal order by holding EU Member States responsible for any action taken pursuant to Community obligations.
Thus, while in Cantoni v. France" 9 in 1996 the Court held that the fact that the impugned domestic legislation was based almost word-for-word on a Community Directive did not render it immune from review under the Convention, the Court has limited itself to consideration of cases where the respondent State has been able to exercise discretion when applying Community law."°T he extent of this tricky tightrope act manifests itself in the Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland case"' which concerned the impounding by the Irish authorities of an aircraft belonging to the applicant company pursuant to a European Council Regulation imposing a trade embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which implemented the United Nations ("UN") sanctions regime against that state designed to address the armed conflict and human rights violations occurring there at that time. procedural differences between the a priori nature of the preliminary reference procedure and the a posteriori supervision of the Strasbourg Court, the protection afforded by Community law is in fact equivalent to that of the Convention. 0 0 Such concerns have bolstered arguments for accession of the EU to the Convention. While accession would not remove the possibility of divergence, it would at least simplify the relationship between the two courts, allowing the Strasbourg Court to review all acts of the Community and allowing the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to operate in a similar manner to Bills of Rights in other Contracting Parties. Most importantly in the national context, it may help to minimize the risk of Member States being caught between the 'rock' of Community law and the 'hard place' of Convention obligations.
At the same time, accession would serve to further strengthen the "institutional triangle" between the Court of Justice, the Strasbourg Court and the national courts, which raises issues that are generally ignored. The central concern arises from the different way in which each court's decisions affect national legal systems. There is no "schematic way," as the German Federal Constitutional Court has put it, of enforcing decisions of the Strasbourg Court," 0 which leaves national courts with considerable discretion. By contrast, decisions of the Court of Justice are, as a matter of Community law, binding on all Member States, including national courts, and thus leave scant discretion to those courts. 10 2 Moreover, the standards of protection for fundamental rights laid down in the ECHR are minimum standards, 1 0 it always being open to contracting states to provide higher or stronger protections for such rights. On the other hand, the degree and scope of protection of such rights as laid down by the Court ofJustice are definitive standards and neither States nor their national courts can rely on a claim to give higher protection to fundamental rights should this conflict with the uniform application of community law. 10 4
These differences become crucial when one considers that the Strasbourg Court takes a consensus-based approach to human rights issues, referring where possible to substantial consensus between contracting parties on a given issue in rendering its decisions. This so-called consensus is often founded, not on the provisions of national constitutions, but on a tabulation or examination of legislative provisions, or even 'emerging trends,' at the national level where a majority of states recognize a particular legal right or give it a particular degree of protection, often to the detriment of the text of the Convention itself. The use of consensus as an interpretive tool in this manner is itself open to criticism and its legitimacy must be further weakened when transported to the Community context, as substantial 'consensus' in the Convention context-among forty-seven states-does not necessarily equate to consensus between the twenty-seven EU Member States. Even in the current climate, where the EU is not a Party to the Convention, the deference shown by the Court of Justice to the Convention system through adherence to Convention case law means that Community law concerning fundamental rights is, to an extent, being 'ghostwritten' by the Strasbourg Court. Thus, decisions of the latter court which do not have direct or erga omnes effect on EU Member States are accorded such effect when used as precedent by the Court of Justice in its judgments. This in turn may give rise to questions concerning the legitimacy of Court of Justice decisions on these issues for the same reasons as they have arisen with regard to the interpretative methods of the Strasbourg Court. This is potentially controversial considering signs of the Court of Justice's increasing willingness to 'interfere,' in the name of fundamental rights, in areas which have traditionally been the preserve of the Member States. A notable example is the Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Akrich case, 10 5 concerning immigration, where the Court instructed a British court that it must have regard to right of the spouse to respect for her family life guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR in assessing the application of her husband, a non-EU (or European Economic Area ("EEA")) national to remain in Britain where the marriage was genuine.
This may be compared with earlier cases such as Demirel v. Stadt Schwdbisch Gmiind' 0 7 where, in a case concerning the reunification of a Turkish national with his family, the Court of Justice said that it had "no power to examine the compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights of national legislation lying outside the scope of Community law"' 8 since there were no Community regulations specifically referring to the conditions for the "family reunification of Turkish workers lawfully settled in the Community." 1 " 9 A further example would be Herbert Karner Industrie-Auktionen GmbH v. Troostwijk GmbH° in which the Court held that a reference for a preliminary ruling relating to the application of Article 28 EC could not be considered inapplicable "simply because all the facts of the specific case before the national court are confined to a single Member State.""' In this manner, the "institutional triangle" that now pertains may be seen as threatening to become a Bermuda triangle in which the importance of national constitutions is lost.
As an international treaty the European Convention on Human Rights is not directly applicable in every state which is a party to it and, in many of the states which are a party it may not have primacy over national law or in particular over national constitutions. Moreover, a state, faced with what it perceived as a wholly unacceptable overriding of a value enshrined in a national constitution, has the express power to repudiate the Convention. 1 12 Even though such a step may involve political difficulties at an international level those difficulties could, in an extreme situation, be outweighed by domestic political difficulties. On the other hand the judicial rulings of the Court of Justice, including when they "import" a Strasbourg Court decision, take precedence over national law, including constitutional law, and are binding on national courts who have a duty to apply them. 13 It is in that context that there is at least a perceived increased risk that national constitutions, and some of their core values, could be emasculated by decisions taken at the European level under the extended rubric of rights protection.
Should the Lisbon Treaty be adopted-and, as I have stated above, this is now less assured-with its Charter of Rights, and followed by accession of the European Union to the Convention on Human Rights, inherent tensions would inevitably exist in a post-Lisbon Europe between the judicial organs that traditionally have a final responsibility in defining and protecting individual rights. These tensions may in turn raise questions concerning the legitimacy of an international or a supranational court making decisions involving core constitutional powers and moral values. However, any such potential problems, either real or perceived, are far different from the challenges which the European Community faced fifty years ago when there was no Charter and the Treaties were entirely silent on fundamental rights. That was a scenario fraught with pitfalls which were overcome by the combined judicial wisdom of the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg and national courts. The potential post-Lisbon problems stem, on the contrary, from an over-endowment of sources of individual rights and institutions charged with protecting them at the supranational and international level. Given the history of the past fifty years it can only be hoped that over time the same wisdom can be brought to bear to find a means by which the judicial protection of fundamental rights can be achieved in a coherent and legitimate manner with due regard for the diversity of Member States to which the preamble of the Lisbon Treaty pays tribute. 
